Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss ongoing developments in the Arab world in the areas of information and communication technology (ICT) and to highlight the obstacles to and present recommendations for further development. We looked at the environment as well as individual, business, and government variables in assessing the current state of development and the impact of national and regional ICT strategies. Our recommendations are addressed to policymakers at the national and regional levels. The scope of this chapter encompasses thirteen countries, which we group according to geography. We defi ne the "Gulf," the "Arabian Gulf," or "Gulf states" as comprising Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. Our defi nition of "Levant" includes Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. We classify Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco as the "Maghreb states."
Overview of Progress in ICT in the Arab World
ICT strategic intent can be measured against published strategy documentation, actual progress in the implementation of ICT strategies, and the presence of technology-building initiatives and research and development (R&D) institutes. We reviewed the ICT-awareness of Arab governments by looking into their strategic plans and operational fi ve-year plans, and observed that there are uneven levels of awareness of and importance given to ICT both in stated national strategies and demonstrated success in implementation.
Arab states are adapting their legal and regulatory frameworks for ICT As Arab states join the World Trade Organization (WTO), they have been adapting their legal and regulatory systems to accommodate trademark, patent, and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection. Some states have been part of the early stages of IPR 1 protection; others have retroactively signed the agreements and sought membership of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (see Figure 1) . Nine of the countries in the scope of this study are members of the WTO, and eleven joined the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 2 on whose principles the WIPO was founded. Arab states' participation in interim treaties is uneven: only four have signed the Patent Cooperation Treaty 3 (PCT) and three the Patent Law Treaty (PLT). There has been improvement in the mid-to-late 1990s, when eight of them joined the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). A joint WTO-WIPO framework, TRIPS revisits the entire IPR protection system, standardizing intellectual property defi nitions, affi rming and enforcing national treatment and most favored nation principles through a series of procedures, and providing Arab states will increasingly become attractive investment targets as TRIPS regulations begin to be enforced. With a standardized IPR protection system and the fact that by January 2005 Arab states are required to extend product patent protection to types of products not previously patented, the region is due to witness further integration into global research and development. Arab states are also drafting new laws to foster ICT growth and investor confi dence at the national levels. Figure 2 highlights Arab states' current efforts in adapting their IPR-related laws to the specifi c needs of technology and ICT. The legal framework upgrade has been uneven: the Levant area and the Maghreb have been, in general, more advanced in creating frameworks, thanks to their earlier exposure to the global legal culture. Latecomers include the Gulf states; their efforts pertaining to the upgrade of these laws have therefore been more recent.
Creation of a research-promoting environment
Arabs states display signifi cant interest in technology initiatives. Materialized via technopoles 4 and/or technology incubators, 5 the benefi ts of these initiatives include providing an environment for research and development in collaboration with private initiatives, developing technology diffusion, benefi ting the social and economic fabric by creating new employment possibilities, building the ecosystem for business development, and enhancing technological transfers between the public and private sectors. In all cases, private-public partnerships and universities play central roles. The political and regulatory environment in the Arab world is being adapted in accordance with best practices from the United States and Europe.
Arab states have been prolifi c on both the technopole and incubator fronts: all countries discussed in this chapter have at least launched a national planning process for these technology-building initiatives, with varying degrees of success in implementation. Figure 3 
Deployment of ICT infrastructure improvement programs
There are several ongoing ICT-infrastructure development initiatives in the Arab world; they are strategically important because of the magnitude of investment, anticipated benefi ts, and fi t with national ICT plans. Progress is measurable in network and teledensity achievements, regional and global connectivity, as well as in operational e-government facilities.
National network upgrades, teledensity improvements, enhanced national connectivity, and the gradual introduction of new Internet provider (IP) delivery technologies are creating a favorable environment for the uptake of ICT. However, much progress remains to be made. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has ranked states based upon national teledensities-Group A, the lowest rank, for countries with less than 1 percent fi xed line penetration rates in 2001; and Group G, the highest rank, with teledensity rates higher than the 50 percent threshold in 2001 (ITU 2002) . Of the thirteen countries under consideration in this chapter, six ranked in the C category (teledensity between the 5 percent and 10 percent); the D and E categories each had three countries, and the United Arab Emirates was on par with Spain and Portugal in the F category (35 percent to 50 percent). National teledensity improvement has to remain a priority in most Arab states. 6 Geographical disparities between the Gulf states and the rest of the region have led to the adoption of diverging national fi xed line development strategies. Most Gulf states are in the process of completing the digitalization of their public networks, whilst Maghreb states are working on densifi cation and upgrading the existing telephone networks. With small populations but high investments in their national networks, Gulf states have matched or outperformed international standards in ICT infrastructure, whereas the densely populated Levant and Maghreb Arab elite increasingly exposed to ICT In many Arab states the speed of the introduction of Internet access devices is increasing rapidly. Individually, Arabian Gulf states display ICT and Internet penetration levels comparable to the West (see Figure 4) . The United Arab Emirates penetration rate of almost 30 percent at the end of 2001 is higher than the European average. RIPE, the European IP * Our defi nition is that an ICT strategy is clear when individual countries publish a set of strategic objectives in the fi eld, either through a national plan or some other medium, and mark measurable and quantifi able accomplishments unto a milestone path. ** Our defi nition is that an ICT plan is clear and operational when budgets have been dedicated to the ICT strategy, a task force, whatever the format, is operationally in place, and when clearly published implementation process is underway." association, ranked the United Arab Emirates 20th globally for Internet host penetration, with a population-to-host ratio of 37, placing it above ICT and e-commerce: benefi ts to Arab businesses
Corporate and multinational segments are responding favorably to ICT. By building transactional and e-commerce platforms, several Arab central banks are laying the ground for operational e-banking and online payments. Despite low levels of readiness in credit card penetration rates in the area, regulations are being designed for online payments. Good examples can be found in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, and Jordan. More than one-fi fth 9 of banks operating in the area now offer online services, from simple banking facilities to payment schemes. For example, by moving some documentary credit procedures online, Lebanese banks now offer escrow services to facilitate and guarantee e-commerce procedures. The United Arab Emirates Central Bank has introduced SSL (Secure Sockets Layer), PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), and smart card technology to foster online banking, and payment gateways are being implemented by some of the large national players.
Entrepreneurial initiatives abound in the area of business e-commerce. Private business-to-business (B2B) marketplace ventures, both Arab and foreign, are entering the market and working with corporations. Commerce One and Aregon, to name a few, are building and offering value propositions covering the whole spectrum of supply chain, enterprise resource management, and procurement. The practice of moving business operations and transactions online is spreading within the corporate sector. Tejari, 10 one of the best examples, now has more than 1,000 members within the United Arab Emirates alone (see Box 1). The benefi cial effects of these initiatives translate into large institutions changing their business habits and moving several of their functions online. The progress is uneven across sectors, with success mostly by large petrochemical groups, contractors, banks, and multinationals.
Traditional Arab businesses: largely unaffected by new technologies
To speak of a uniform Arab business community is a misnomer. Within large national corporations and multinationals, the Arab world's ability to effectively integrate and compete in e-commerce and ICT is largely proven. Digital marketplaces, exchanges and clearing house initiatives abound, with the large corporate players employing best practices in the fi eld. Unfortunately, this is not true for the rest-in fact, for the vast majority of Arab businesses. Arab small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) shy away from technology despite the anticipated benefi ts. Due to security concerns and linguistic barriers, most SMEs rely on personal interactions and have not moved their operations online. Banks, the traditional business facilitators in the area, are poor technological mentors, especially in Egypt and the Maghreb. Underprepared for the ICT revolution, few offer transaction platforms, security features, and credit facilities for SMEs to acquire access technology. Most Arab business websites remain informational, offering at best online cataloguing. With little training and poor levels of awareness, SMEs do not benefi t from access to new markets and interArab trade potential.
Progression of Arab e-government
The governments of Arab states are moving many of their operations online. From simple online availability of administrative forms to full online automation, several are migrating their procurement, customs, and citizen management capabilities onto electronic platforms. The rationale behind the move is multiple: better cost control, increased business effi ciencies, greater global integration and in some cases, competition across states (especially in the Arabian Gulf area). Special mention has to be made of with an average of about 500 reverse auctions per month. Trade revenues are increasing, and plans are to triple or even quadruple trade through its network to US$400 million or more in 2002. Most interestingly, by removing geographical boundaries, Tejari operates beyond the borders of the Emirate of Dubai, through a series of partnerships between platforms, and by recruiting members in the GCC, including Saudi Arabia, and as far as Algeria. "Basically, it is a community of buyers and suppliers, many to many, independent of where the buyers and suppliers are at the end of the day," comments Al-Qasimi. Tejari does much to educate the market. According to Al-Qasimi, "training of local resources too has been done heavily, in partnership with the community…we have partnered with ITI Zayed University and the Higher Colleges of Technology to create a real pull for the technology."
Al-Qasimi emphasizes how Tejari.com has not only proven to be a local success but has also created an international best practice: "Tejari.com follows, and often leads, the technical best practices of global B2B marketplaces. The creation of Tejari.com is an example of high local technological and business strategy input. Tejari is all home-grown, and we are proud to say that we have been able to export some of what we have learned and developed; many exchanges in Europe and the United States [have] adopted some of our business guidelines. Some are, in fact, looking to us for such tools as e-learning and e-cataloguing, in terms of strategy."
Tejari breaks the rules of traditional Arab trade patterns, leveraging technology to change the procurement habits of an entire Arab state, whilst creating urgency in the private sector to join the e-commerce bandwagon. This is one of the fi rst examples of digital liquidity and real market effi ciency in the region, crossing over the natural geographical and mental commerce boundaries of the area. The Dubai government has used the Tejari platform to raise awareness and educate its national market on the benefi ts of e-commerce, via marketing campaigns, educational seminars, and fi nancial incentives. The Dubai government is now showcasing Tejari as a model for other Arab states' e-government and e-procurement initiatives.
Tejari is a good example for other Arab states to follow to move their business online and ensure a critical mass of the private sector migrates to electronic platforms. e-Government procurement platforms also enable inter-Arab trade by creating new channels to otherwise inaccessible markets. Government support is critical in championing the move, educating the market, and improving economic effi ciency. Ensuring technology transfers and arabization to the benefi t of other Arab governments will be a critical success factor: Tejari plans on furthering the "arabization" of its platform, as the model moves into countries with less knowledge of the English language. A public-private partnership, Tejari.com was originally planned as the vehicle through which government departments could procure goods and services online and benefi t from time and cost effi ciencies. "The decision on the strategy was to start with the Dubai government fi rst, due to their large pool of suppliers and to create confi dence, proof of concept, and critical mass," notes Al-Qasimi. Cooperation with the government was sealed through an agreement (Tejari 2001 ) with Dubai's Ruler Court (agency overseeing the twenty-four government departments of the Emirate of Dubai), where a three-month timeframe was imposed on Dubai government departments to migrate transactions online, and hence lure the private sector online if they were to continue transacting with the government. Sources agree that the early take-off of the e-marketplace can be attributed to leadership of the Dubai government "forcing" the participation of their constituencies (i.e., the administration and the upper crust of the corporate sector).
Operating an "open horizontal" business model, Tejari covers a wide range of commodities including oil and gas, construction, pharmaceuticals, automotive and spare parts, electronics, offi ce equipment, stationery, fast-moving consumer goods, and food and services. Although Tejari is not the only regional e-marketplace, it is the only such government-owned project and, signifi cantly, one of the few marketplaces with a guaranteed demand side. Tejari's vision today is to become the leading B2B exchange in the Middle East and to play an active role in the transformation of the regional online economy.
The policy of government participation proved successful, as within its fi rst year of operation, Tejari boasted over 125 members within and outside the Emirates. Tejari now claims more than 1,040 members, the United Arab Emirates, and of the Emirate of Dubai in particular. Three initiatives represent Dubai's governmental commitment to ICT: Dubai Internet City, the e-government initiative, and Tejari. The aim of these initiatives is to connect government offi ces and citizens, facilitate transactions, and provide convenient services (e-procurement) to citizens (e.g., online payment of utilities). The success of the e-government and e-procurement initiatives have "forced" businesses wishing to work with the government to adapt their processes, invest in technological platforms, raise technology awareness, and to seek training.
e-Government and e-procurement models are spreading across the area-Arab states are demonstrating responsiveness to the need to integrate digitally and migrate some of their administration online. All governments are not seeking to replicate Dubai's ambitious model. We identifi ed at least three fully operational e-government platforms in the area, but it is important to note that more than eight (new or extensions of existing) e-government initiatives are planned, with varying levels of technological sophistication and scope of ambitions. Hajji 2001 ) and Jordan's 11 e-government initiatives. As telecommunications continue to deregulate and ICT access tools become more available, e-government is expected to become more successful in the area.
Challenges for the Uptake of ICT

Obstacles relating to the environment
Most challenges in ICT adoption and usage lie in the political and regulatory environment. With uneven records in legal and regulatory issues, weak ICT strategies, chronic R&D shortages, excessive reliance on foreign technology, and ongoing weaknesses in ICT implementation, Arab states are frequently lagging in their readiness for the networked future.
High software piracy rates jeopardize confi dence
With one of the highest software piracy rates in the world and displaying poor records on IPR protection, Arab states increasingly suffer bad press and a lack of credibility, with looming restrictions in technology transfers. The Business Software Alliance 12 
Regulatory framework ignores the Arab citizen
As they seek WTO membership, Arab states are taking action to harmonize their legal systems with TRIPS (see Figure 1) . By 2005, Arab states, classifi ed as developing countries, are obliged to extend product patent protection on products not previously patented in these countries. Main provisions include standardized defi nitions of intellectual property, implementation of the "national treatment" and "most favored nation" principles, the establishment of antipiracy and protection enforcement procedures, and clauses for swift dispute treatment. While regulatory frameworks are being updated to ensure investor protection, personal liberty and consumer protection rights issues have not yet been fully addressed. Analysts question why Arab states maintain lax policies pertaining to encryption, while restricting and censoring the actual content available online. The fact that no Arab software company actually produces encryption technology or has such capabilities may be part of the explanation. With no national encryption technology at stake, Arab states do not have the same incentives as the United States in restricting encryption technology export or circulation. Conversely, moral and societal considerations seem to explain the tardiness of Internet introduction in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia, for example, has publicly stated 13 that it will seek to protect its citizens from immoral Internet content Insuffi cient funding for ICT research and development Figure 6 ). The consequences of this poor performance in technology are to further the "brain drain" and to accentuate the loss of sovereignty in implementing national ICT strategies. Few Arab states (e.g., Algeria and Tunisia) retain some degree of technology independence. Reliance on foreign technology could be symptomatic of a certain lack of government and business leadership and understanding of the benefi ts of indigenous ICT research and autonomy. (Figure 7 ). Speed of service remains a sensitive concern. With poor connectivity and high prices, the Internet has had little impact as far as changing business and working habits in the area. Arab entrepreneurs have little incentive to create communications ventures-although the ISP sector is privatized in most cases, high-value markets such as broadband remain off limits. Combined with the scarcity of seed money to create alternative communications champions, the slow pace of deregulation is stunting the development of competitive ICT offerings in the region.
"Digital poverty:" mediocre bandwidth and connectivity
The Arab world's mediocre performance on bandwidth and connectivity leaves some markets severely underserved. In 2000, the media announced staggering connectivity fi gures, equating the entire bandwidth availability for the Arab world to that of 500 U.S. 
Poor interconnectivity of Arab IP systems
The various Arab IP systems do not interconnect, impeding interregional IP communications and inter-Arab trade and e-commerce. When a consumer in Cairo wants to access information on a Qatar-hosted website, his/her communication goes via the IP backbone into a New York gateway and is then redirected into Qatar! Figure 8 highlights the poor state of peering and interconnectivity between Arab states. With no Pan-Arab connectivity initiative, some Arab states rely on regional cooperation, linking their gateways to the global backbone. Fibre Optic Gulf, the leading GCC initiative, linking Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, is a prime example of successful cooperation. Links between Levant states are underway. The consequences of infrastructure fragmentation are refl ected in the Internet usage patterns of the area: slow service, minimal inter-Arab e-commerce, reliance on international private or semiprivate IP networks, and lack of competitiveness in connectivity alternatives. Few Arab states are privy to backbone connectivity initiatives at the global level. Saudi Arabia, one of the founding fi nancers of FLAG 14 Europe-Asia, is linked via a 10 gbps gateway connection to the global backbone. It also partnered with France Cable Radio on the SE-ME-WE 15 project. The success of these initiatives in the early 1990s has not been met by expansion and upgrade plans. In subsequent developments, FLAG now offers its north east Asian loop a capacity of up to 3,800 gbps. Consequently, it is simpler for Arab end users to connect with European and U.S. IP destinations, rather than with IP destinations within Arab states.
Obstacles relating to individual capabilities and access to technology
Several of the obstacles faced by individual countries are deeply engrained. Such obstacles include societal rigidity, weaknesses in education, unfair income distribution, and uneven access to technology.
An increasing Arab "brain drain"
Arab states risk jeopardizing their efforts in building ICT and e-commerce industries-dissatisfaction with national economic reforms, and the defi cits in work opportunities, research and education, are causing younger Arabs to seek expatriation. A cross-sectional poll of Arab youth conducted by the UNDP (2002) highlights a worrying trend: 45 percent of respondents expressed a desire to emigrate. The main concerns voiced in the poll were the lack of job opportunities (45 percent), education (23 percent), and distribution of income and wealth (8 percent). The term "educated elite" could be misleading: a two-tier educational system is emerging, where a wealthy minority enjoys expensive private education while the bulk of the population attends poorerquality underfunded government universities. In the same report, the UNDP states that "the most worrying aspect of the crisis in education is its inability to provide the requirements for the development of Arabs, that is, [education is] losing its power as a conduit for social advancement." The budgets allocated to education are decreasing-in relative terms, per capita expenditure on education in Arab countries dropped from 20 percent of that in industrialized countries in 1980 to 10 percent in the mid-1990s. The "brain drain" is well researched: 1 million highly-qualifi ed Arab scientists and professionals reside in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. Far from slowing, this trend has been intensifying over the last quarter of the last century. The brain drain is unevenly spread across the region. The Maghreb and Levant areas suffer higher rates than the Gulf because of diffi cult socioeconomic conditions, lack of social incentives, limited employment perspectives, shortages in research budgets, and chronic technology underinvestment.
The brain drain translates into slowing down the process and pace of creating indigenous ICT industries, furthering the technology gap between the Arab world and the rest of the world, and increasing the reliance of Arab states on foreign technology transfers and aid.
Digital divide remains
The digital divide is caused by a combination of the structural fragmentation of societies and the lack of leadership in many Arab states with regard to ICT policies and implementation. The divide is aggravated by the absence of cross-Arab initiatives, lack of fi nancing, and poor education. There are three aspects to the digital divide in Arab states: (1) the divide between the Arab world as a whole and the rest of the world, (2) the divide across Arab states, and (3) the divide within Arab states. The digital divide with the rest of the world can be measured using variables such as teledensity, PC penetration, numbers of websites, and number of Internet users. Studies rank Arab states, as a whole, poorly as compared to other groups of nations (World Bank 2001). Although Arab states do not severely underperform when ranked by world standards in teledensity and PC penetration, they remain weak on number of websites and Internet users. Limited local content and the monopolistic nature of the telecommunications sector are key obstacles. The benefi ts of using the Internet as a source of knowledge creation, as opposed to accessing existing knowledge, is not suffi ciently recognized in Arab societies.
The digital divide across Arab states refl ects the income and population characteristics of the region. The UNDP contrasts the situation of the more advanced GCC states with countries in the rest of the region, which are largely characterized by poor infrastructure, an uncompetitive telecommunications industry, resistance to the introduction of new ICT services, limitations in banking facilities, and limited political and regulatory leadership. Others report little progress on the digital divide issue (Dewachi 2002) . The same factors dividing Arab states seem to be at play on the national level, accentuated by the linguistic barrier (local educated elites accessing English language knowledge online vs. local-language literate and illiterate masses), cultural aspects (gender segregation), and weaknesses in the educational system.
Arab states have undertaken new initiatives 16 to reduce the digital divide. Although these initiatives create technology awareness, they highlight the inaccessibility of PC equipment for most of the population. We did not identify any largescale public-private partnerships between policymakers and the banking sector to create credit facilities for computer purchases. Most are private initiatives, and do not address a national requirement or need for ICT penetration. Maintaining the digital divide negatively impacts the Arab market's uptake of ICT and e-commerce, as the equipment acquisition decision is endlessly postponed and e-commerce transactions remain unaffordable to the masses. Given the regional infrastructure defi ciency, ESCWA estimates that an investment of around US$40 billion is required to bring ICT penetration rates up to the world average.
Obstacles in business and governmental sectors
The private sector, especially banks, is accentuating structural fl aws by not actively promoting the necessary market uptake initiatives. Governmental initiatives remain limited, as they rely excessively on foreign policymakers in their procurement decisions and neglect the local language as a development tool.
Scarce Arab payment and transaction platforms
Few local banks offer operational transaction platforms, and credit card penetration is low amidst concerns of poor security and fraud. The lack of national fi nancial development policies has a direct impact on private investment and business development in general, and on IT infrastructure in particular. The Arab retail banking market is excessively reliant on "brick and mortar"-from large multinational banking groups to regional players, and from generalists to specialized Islamic banking actors, transactional e-banking preparedness is low. In 2000, only 18 percent of banks offered online transactional facilities. Although there were some local players (in Lebanon and the Gulf), these were mostly foreign banks with regional presence. Thirty-nine percent of the banks in the region did not even maintain an informational website. Arab e-banking and e-transactions also suffer from the absence of clearing house alternatives to central banks, as most clearinghouses have yet to move their operations online. The absence of digital certifi cation laws and the nonexistence of credible local third-party security enablers discourages Arab banks from moving online. Credit card penetration in Arab states is fragmented along income lines, which is caused by the same factors as those causing the digital divide. Gulf states rank above the 20 percent credit card penetration rate level, whilst most Levant states and the Maghreb are under the 5 percent threshold.
Weak local ICT capabilities
Statistics on Arab ICT procurement decisions show that nearly all equipment is imported. In the absence of local ICT production, Arab ICT, e-commerce, and related industries cannot be thought of as having a bright future unless local technological development plans are elaborated on and adopted, either by one champion nation, or through an interArab decision. Weaknesses in local software development capabilities increase reliance on foreign technology, especially in terms of programming, language standards defi nition, and software development. Most servers belong to the UNIX system family, and almost all are in the public domain. There is also incompatibility between the Arabic provided on these platforms and the commercial Internet browsers that populate the overwhelming majority of Arab PCs. The proportion of software published and translated into Arabic is low, refl ecting limited Arab software development demand. The confl ict between proprietary and open standards 17 renders information available on servers only marginally displayable on proprietary platforms, and this deters Arab content developers.
Marginal local language content
The lack of local language content availability shuts out the Arab public from ICT and e-commerce. Most content available in the Arab world is informational (vs. transactional). Whereas there are 300 million Arabic speakers in the world, ranking the language as the 6th in terms of usage, websites in the Arabic language represented less than one percent of all websites in 2001 18 . Despite domain name registration progress in Arab states, the inability to offer reliable, up-to-date content in local languages is an obstacle. Because of the lack of capability to develop software and representation tools (e.g., Arabic HTML-HyperText Markup Language-tags), the absence of programming languages in Arabic (e.g., C++), and the absence of Arabic tools or protocols for data representation (e.g., HTML and XML -Extensible Markup Language), the limitations on content development are high, as technicians are required to master both English and Arabic. When added to the problem of standards, this human resource limitation severely restricts content development. Addressing this limitation calls for major policy decisions on standards enforcement and the buildup of local content skills capabilities. A single country cannot make these decisions; this highlights the need for inter-Arab cooperation.
Prescriptions
Based upon our research described in the previous sections, we outline below some policy prescriptions for business and government leaders in the Arab world.
Create a common Arab ICT strategy aligned with national ambitions A Pan-Arab planning effort aiming to create a transnational ICT strategic plan 19 is recommended as a starting action item. Based upon a critical assessment of the region's capabilities, the plan would defi ne the overall objectives of the various nations and translate objectives into measurable milestones. This common ICT strategy should be treated with a clear commitment for implementation. The strategic recommendations of a transnational Arab ICT-planning agency, independent of national contingencies, will nevertheless have to rely on Arab funding. Ensuring that the funding and commitment requirements will be met is key. That implies creating transnational teams devoted to the overall strategy and that are expected to lead the implementation of the initiative.
Arab ICT planning should not be reduced to infrastructure acquisition decisions, but should encompass all aspects of ICT, including software and content development. The importance of the plan being Arab, and building on Arab strengths and weaknesses, cannot be overstressed. The Arab ICT plan should, above all, seek to anchor the Arab world as a key player of the ICT revolution, not merely a participant at the buyer level. The plan should also include an assessment of how industrial and economic benefi ts can be generated, and seek to build regional centers of ICT excellence as a source of technology exports using local, not imported, skills. No ICT planning is conceivable without the freedom of movement of skills and capabilities across borders. The scarcity of local skills makes this condition essential. To reverse the brain drain effect, a special "technology passport" could be created as the symbol of inter-Arab policy.
Benefi ts should fl ow down to the regional and national levels, with appropriate implementation and funding support. The implications are threefold:
1. Creating an investment plan for inter-Arab technology development with allocation mechanisms across countries, aimed at fi nancing the creation and growth of the critical components of an ICT industrial base.
2. Coordinating national funding plans with the overall Arab ICT funding program. An inter-Arab ICT strategy should build on the complementarities and competitive advantages of Arab nations. We expect this to generate substantial effi ciencies compared to the overlaps caused by independent and parallel national approaches.
3. Engaging with the banking and fi nancial community in building technology fi nancing mechanisms with government support. This will be critical to developing a commercial credit policy that favors local companies that have the skill to compete and win contracts in both Arab and international markets.
Proceed towards technological sovereignty
Technological sovereignty means autonomy in choices, control of national destiny, and technological development. Technological sovereignty begins by "building not buying;" that is, by not reducing ICT-building initiatives to procurement decisions. Arab states should aim for the development of an indigenous ICT industry. Empowered with a national strategy in mind, Arab states should use joint-venture collaboration as sources of technology transfers, through local value-added requirements. 20 "Buying local" when the product and service are available and giving advantages to suppliers from fellow Arab countries, will enhance the overall inter-Arab ICT planning and implementation effort. ICT and e-commerce within the Arab states will require infrastructure decisions that encompass the entire area. A coordinated infrastructure plan across the region is critical. Secure and resilient, the Arab interconnectivity system will have to be technology independent and coupled with a human resources plan for installation, management, and maintenance. The inter-Arab connectivity plan will have to be institutionalized via a PanArab structure, with offi cial acceptance and funding. Such an endeavor should seek to leverage some of the national centers of excellence.
Increase the competitiveness of the telecommunications industry
Deregulation in the Arab world is often misunderstood, being perceived as a source of generating new money for budget defi cits and as the government abandoning the sector. The competitive benefi ts of deregulation, such as better access to technology and enhanced creativity, are often misrepresented. Successful deregulation examples can be found in areas where local skills or local technological environments or a combination of both exist. We recommend ensuring that deregulation is a consistent part of the national strategic ICT plan to inject new technologies into the ICT sector and provide more competitive services to Arab citizens. Governments should continue the deregulation of the telecommunications industry, ensuring that results achieved are congruent with national plans, and intervene in a clearly defi ned legal framework to steer the industry when necessary. By promoting the spin-off of local centers of excellence, Arab states can deregulate certain sections of their national telecommunications industries to the benefi t of national Arab players. Alternative connectivity providers and trade media, such as marketplaces, can extend the ISP deregulation footprint by generating economic activity, which would allow the emergence of Arab ICT champions. Deregulation can also be a tool to acquire technology transfers from foreign entities by including the stipulation that entry of foreign players requires technology transfer and investment in the training of local talent.
Recognize, attract, and build human capital
Researchers and technologists do not elicit the same level of respect in the Arab world as they do elsewhere. Arab states need to take measures to ensure that proper skills are developed and retained in the region. The skills lost in the brain drain cannot be attracted exclusively with fi nancial incentives. Creating higher institutes of learning and R&D at the Pan-Arab level will garner respect, enthusiasm, and support from learning communities elsewhere. Such institutes could thrive in the region, were they to have a standardized knowledge base and be endowed with appropriate levels of funding. Committed to a national preference policy in research, the institutes would create incentives for educated elites to apply their talent locally. A good reference example is the investment made by the Indian government to create elite institutions of higher learning, such as the Indian Institutes of Technology and the Indian Institutes of Management.
Graduates of these institutions play important roles in the development of the Indian ICT industry, and these institutions serve as magnets attracting expatriate Indian scientists home.
Reduce the digital divide
The Arab citizen should be at the center of efforts to develop ICT in the Arab world. Building the human base and reducing the digital divide are critical to these efforts. Reducing the digital divide and attenuating its effects offers benefi ts beyond ICT penetration, such as fostering social cohesion and producing a new generation of national leaders. While commending the initiatives underway, we highlight the importance of expanding these initiatives' magnitude, by 1. Multiplying ubiquitous IP initiatives to educate the market and generate enthusiasm to study and learn technology in schools and universities 21 ;
2. Encouraging the adoption of ICT access devices (such as PCs and personal digital assistants) as a national priority, with policies subsidizing ICT equipment purchases; and 3. Partnering with the banking sector to create policies and fi nancial incentives for investments in ICT. The goal of such action should not be limited to ICT equipment acquisition, but should include the creation of the "ecosystem" necessary for a widespread adoption of ICT in Arab societies.
Stimulate Arabic content
The creation of Arabic content is central to the robust development of ICT in the Arab world. Enhanced ICT adoption and use allows for better communication and coordination across different stakeholders in the Arab world, such as individual citizens, businesses, and governments. Thus, it is natural that Arabic has to evolve as the language of choice. Standardization and the creation of a "language watchdog" are useful approaches. We recommend planning the evolution towards an institutionalized Arabic research watchdog and orientation team composed of industry leaders to collaboratively establish a research reference in the Arabic language and articulate current and future needs. Matching the Arab technological research and procurement mandates with local linguistic needs can be achieved by allocating research budgets for language localization initiatives in universities and the private sector, and signalling the critical role of "arabization." By favoring companies and universities that develop "arabization" using Arab human resources and researchers, member states will confi rm their commitment to building a national ICT plan. This could entail buying only bilingual Arabic/ foreign software adhering to the adopted standards, and making the usage of Arabic mandatory on government and administration systems.
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